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RECENT DECISIONS
as it sufficiently appears that taxpayer did not act with a view to
defeat the intent and purposes of the tax law.3 It has been held
that the test of the good faith of the taxpayer is whether a prudent
business man would have acted as the taxpayer did in ascertaining
the worthlessness of the debt. 4 Although the debt must be deducted
in the year in which the taxpayer ascertains it to be worthless, the
law does not impose upon the taxpayer the absolute risk of selecting
the year when it actually becomes so.5 The real question is not when
did the debt become worthless, but when did the taxpayer ascertain
it to be worthless.6 In answering that question the taxpayer must
be allowed a fair degree of latitude.7
J. L. G.
LIMITATIONS-INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT-INVALIDITY OF
AGREEMENT BY SHIPPER NOT TO PLEAD.-Respondent, carrier, sued
to recover the amount of freight charges on twenty-one carloads
shipped by petitioner over its own and connecting carriers' lines.
The issue is whether the action was brought in time under Section
16(3) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act which provided: "All ac-
tions at law by.carriers subject to this Act for recovery of their
charges, or any part thereof, shall be begun within three years from
the time the cause of action accrues, and not after." Three days be-
fore the expiration of the term allowed, the petitioner agreed not
to plead in any suit the defense of any general or special statute of
limitations in consideration of respondent's forbearance to sue for a
specified time. Two months later, respondent brought this action.
Petitioner contends that the statute prohibits maintenance of the action
notwithstanding its agreement. Respondent insists that the act has
merely modified its common-law contractual right and that the pro-
vision may be waived, and it attempts to distinguish between cases
like this one and others in which- the shipper sues the carrier to
recover excess charges paid or damages for the charging of unreason-
able rates.' Held, the agreement is invalid as being contrary to the
intent and effect of the section and the Act. The primary intention
3 Moore v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 101 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A.
2d, 1939).
4 Peyton Du-Pont Securities Co. v. Com'r, 66 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 2d,
1933).
5 Rosenthal v. Helvering, 124 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).6 Jones v. Com'r, 38 F. (2d) 550 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930).
7 Blair v. Com'r, 91 F. (2d) 992 (C. C.-A. 2d, 1937).
I A. J. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 236 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct.
444 (1915). There the Court held that the objection to the timeliness of the
shipper's suit was properly raised b, demurrer and said: "the lapse of time
destroys the liability." See Galveston H. & S. Ry. v. Webster, 27 F. (2d)
765, 124 P. (2d) 906 (1928) ; Kansas City Southern R. R. v. Wolf, 261 U. S.
133, 43 Sup. Ct. 259 (1923).
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of Section 16 was to secure promptness of payment in order to
avoid discriminatory practices. Legislative history clearly indicates
a tendency toward placing the carrier and shipper on an equal
footing. The decision should not turn on refinements over whether
the residuum of freedom to contract which the Act leaves to the
parties, or the quantum or restrictions it imposes, constitutes the
gist of the action. Mid State Horticultural Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania
R. R., 320 U. S. 356, 64 Sup. Ct. 128 (1943).
This decision expressly overrules the only other case in which
this precise question was before the federal courts. 2  The principal
case is in line with the finding of Finn v. United States 3 which held
that the general rule that the limitation does not operate by its own
force as a bar, but is a defense, and that the party making such a
defense must plead the statute if he wishes the benefit of its provi-
sions has no application to suits in the Court of Claims against the
United States.4 The cause of action is deemed to accrue on delivery
or tender of delivery of the shipment by the carriers and not after.5
However, if claim for the overcharge is presented in writing to the
carrier within the period of limitations, said period is extended to
include six months from the time notice in writing is given by the
carrier to the claimant for disallowance of the claim. 6 An agreement
by the carrier to reconsider a previously declined claim cannot have
the effect of extending the period of limitation.7 In an action after
the federal limitation was changed to two years, the court held that
the new statute would not be given retroactive effect.8  The statute
has been construed to affect not only causes of action arising out
of actual movement of property, but also cause's of action for storage
and demurrage charges.' The fact that the limitation period against
carrier's action for recovery of freight charges ran while dispute as
to charges was being considered by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission at shipper's request did not estop the shipper from setting up
the defense of the statute of limitations.' 0 There is no similar limita-
tion with respect to motor carriers and freight forwarders. Some
decisions hold that a contractual provision is lawful if the period is
2 Pennsylvania R. R. v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 23 F. (2d) 499
(1927).
3 Cited infra note 4.
4 Munro v. United States, 303 U. S. 36, 58 Sup. Ct. 421, 82 L. ed. 633
(1938); Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227, 8 Sup. Ct. 82, 31 L. ed. 128
(1887).5 49 U. S. C. § 16(3) (e).
6 Id. § 16 (3) (c).
7 L. M. Kirkpatrick Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 190 Miss. 157, 195 So.
692 (1940).8 United States v. St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry., 270 U. S. 1, 46 Sup. Ct. 182,
70 L. ed. 435 (1925).
9 Pennsylvania R. R. v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 16 F. (2d) 760
(1927).




reasonable even though the specified period is shorter than the statu-
tory term of limitation of the state.11 In the event there is no con-
tractual provision, the statutes of limitation of the states govern the
action. In a suit by the carrier to collect an undercharge in express
rates on interstate shipments, a defense was the prescription of two
years under the Louisiana statute, but it was held that the three-year
federal statute applied.1 2  In an action by a carrier to recover an
excessive refund, the action was held to be one on implied contract
to refund money and not barred by the statute.' 3
A. J. D.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-AcTION'AGAINST ACCOMMODATION
PARTY-PROMISE NOT To ENFORCE THE INSTRUENT.-In an action
brought by the payees against an indorser of a promissory note (the
end note of a series of renewals), the indorser set up the specific
defense that the indorsement was without consideration and for the
accommodation of the payees upon the understanding that he would
not be liable to them. Defendant testified that when the maker asked
him to indorse the original note, defendant, before doing so, called
the payees and asked them why the indorsement was wanted; that
payees replied they intended to discount the note and needed another
name because they were "afraid the bank wouldn't take it" with the
only indorsement it then bore, that of the maker's wife; that there
was an agreement that as between defendant and payees, defendant
would not be liable; that with this agreement in mind he signed the
renewal notes; and that at no time had he received any considera-
tion. The note had been discounted by the bank and the proceeds
credited to the payees' account. At maturity it had not been paid,
but renewed, and further renewals had thereafter been made, the
defendant indorsing the note on each occasion. The end note had
been protested and charged into the account of the payees, who there-
upon brought the action. The jury returned a verdict favorable to
the defendant, upon which verdict judgment was entered dismissing
the complaint. The Appellate Division of the Third Judicial Depart-
ment, by a non-unanimous order,' reversed the judgment of the Trial
Term upon the law 2 and the facts, holding that denial of plaintiffs'
motion for a directed verdict was error, inasmuch as there was no
"IAdams v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 124 Cal. 393, 12 P. (2d) 464
(1932) ; Provident Fund Society v. Howell, 110 Ala. 508, 18 So. 311 (1895).
Contra: Aetna Casualty Co. v. U. S. Gypsum"Co., 239 Ky. 247, 39 S. W. (2d)
234 (1931).
12 Strawberry Growers' Selling Co. v. American Railway Express, 31 F.
(2d) 947, 83 A. L. R. 246 (1929).13 T. M. Partridge Lumber Co. v. Michigan Central R. R., 26 F. (2d) 615(1928).
1Callery v. Lyons, 265 App. Div. 604, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 191 (1943).
2 See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 55.
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